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P AT E N T L AW
The Standard for Awarding Attorney Fees Under 35 U.S.C. § 285
to Prevailing Parties in Patent Litigation
CASE AT A GLANCE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in two patent infringement cases that both concern shifting of
attorney fees under the “exceptional case” standard of 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Federal Circuit has traditionally
been resistant to fee shifting awards—especially in cases where an accused infringer is the prevailing
party. In Octane Fitness, petitioner asks the Court to lower the standard for proving an exceptional case. In
Highmark, petitioner asks for deference to lower court exceptional case findings.

Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. and Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Management Systems
Docket Nos. 12-1184 and 12-1163
Argument Date: February 26, 2014
From: The Federal Circuit
by Dennis Crouch and Jafon Fearson
University of Missouri School of Law, Columbia, MO

INTRODUCTION

ISSUES

In the United States, each party to litigation ordinarily pays its own
attorney fees regardless of the case outcome. In the patent litigation context, this changes as 35 U.S.C. § 285 provides an avenue
for awarding “reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party” in
“exceptional cases” at the discretion of the lower court. However,
discretion only goes so far, and the Federal Circuit’s standard for
classifying an “exceptional case” has been critiqued as too rigid,
tough, and pro-patentee. It is those same complaints that led to
reversal by the Supreme Court in a number of other patent cases
such as KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (obviousness)
and eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (injunctive relief).

In Octane Fitness, the question presented is: Does the Federal
Circuit’s promulgation of a rigid and exclusive two-part test for
determining whether a case is “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285
improperly appropriate a district court’s discretionary authority to
award attorney fees to prevailing accused infringers in contravention of statutory intent and this Court’s precedent, thereby raising
the standard for accused infringers (but not patentees) to recoup
fees and encouraging patent plaintiffs to bring spurious patent
cases to cause competitive harm or coerce unwarranted settlements
from defendants?

In both Octane Fitness and Highmark, the Federal Circuit sided with
the patentees who lost their infringement actions. In Octane Fitness,
the Federal Circuit confirmed that the case was not “exceptional,”
while in Highmark, a divided Federal Circuit reversed an exceptional case finding based upon a de novo appellate review that gave
no deference to the district court’s finding that the lawsuit was
objectively baseless.
Patent litigation is incredibly expensive, and most patent infringement actions rely on alternative litigation financing such as contingency fee. These two factors suggest that changing the likelihood
of fee shifting is a form of tort reform that may greatly alter the risk
calculus and the market for patent litigation.
Although separate, the Supreme Court has paired these cases for
oral arguments.
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In Highmark, the question presented is: Is a district court’s exceptional case finding under 35 U.S.C. § 285, based on its judgment that
a suit is objectively baseless, entitled to deference?

FACTS
ICON originally sued Octane for infringing its patent covering a
particular configuration of an elliptical exerciser. U.S. Patent No.
6,019,710. After two years of pretrial litigation, the district court
awarded Octane summary judgment of noninfringement. However,
the district court refused to then award attorney fees under § 285
based upon the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture standard. Brooks
Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2005). On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of
fees—holding that the court was not prepared “to revisit the settled
standard for exceptionality.”
Highmark centers on a computerized health management system
covered by Allcare’s U.S. Patent No. 5,301,105. The lawsuit arose
when Highmark filed action seeking a declaratory judgment of
noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability, and Allcare
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

counterclaimed with allegations that Highmark infringed claims 52,
53, and 102 of the ’105 patent. On summary judgment, the district
court agreed with Highmark that the challenged claims were not
infringed and also awarded attorney fees based upon an exceptional
case finding—stating that Allcare had engaged in “the sort of
conduct that gives the term ‘patent troll’ its negative connotation.”
On appeal, the Federal Circuit confirmed the noninfringement
holding but partially reversed the fee award since Allcare’s infringement theory vis-à-vis claim 52 was “not objectively baseless” and
none of Allcare’s litigation actions rose to actionable litigation
misconduct. Ultimately, the Federal Circuit remanded the case to
the district court “for a calculation of attorneys’ fees based on the
frivolity of only the 102 claim allegations.” The Federal Circuit gave
no deference to the district court conclusion that all of Allcare’s
infringement allegations were objectively baseless. Rather, the
Federal Circuit reviewed that issue de novo. Although the request
for en banc review was denied, five of the eleven voting judges
would have reheard the case. One dissent noted that the majority
decision “establishes a review standard for exceptional case finding
in patent cases that is squarely at odds with the highly deferential
review adopted by every regional circuit and the Supreme Court in
other areas of law.”

CASE ANALYSIS
The primary focus of both appeals is the exceptional case determination with Octane addressing the substantive requirements
necessary to prove an exceptional case and Highmark addressing
the procedural standard of review and level of deference given to the
lower court.
U.S. patent infringement litigation typically follows the traditional
American Rule that each party is responsible for its own attorney
and expert witness fees. The patent statute does provide for a
reasonable fee shifting award, but only to the “prevailing party” and
only in “exceptional cases.” 35 U.S.C. § 285. The Federal Circuit has
established a four-step process for evaluating claims under § 285
that involves determining (1) the prevailing party; (2) whether the
case is exceptional; (3) if exceptional, whether a fee award is appropriate; and (4) the amount of the award, if any.
In its 2005 Brooks Furniture decision, the Federal Circuit laid down
its structure for the exceptional case test. There, the court seemingly spelled out a limited set of actions sufficient to prove an exceptional case. In particular, the court noted that an exceptional case
award may only be based upon either (1) material inappropriate
conduct; or (2) objectively baseless litigation brought in subjective
bad faith. According to the Federal Circuit:
A case may be deemed exceptional when there has been
some material inappropriate conduct related to the matter
in litigation, such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in procuring the patent, misconduct during
litigation, vexatious or unjustified litigation, conduct
that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infractions … Absent
misconduct in conduct of the litigation or in securing the
patent, sanctions may be imposed against the patentee
only if both (1) the litigation is brought in subjective bad
faith, and (2) the litigation is objectively baseless.
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The test for baseless litigation is derived from the Supreme Court
Noerr-Pennington line of cases that protect parties who petition the
government from being charged with anticompetitive behavior—
even when seeking anticompetitive action from the government.
That doctrine has been extended to shield private tort actions as
well—absent sham litigation. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49 (1993) (only sham litigation if
both objectively and subjectively baseless).
The language of § 285 has remained unchanged since its enactment
as part of the major patent reforms of 1952. The predecessor statute,
passed a few years earlier in 1946, was substantially similar but
had two major differences. In particular, the 1946 act expressly gave
the court “discretion” to award attorney fees to the prevailing party,
while the 1952 act removed the “discretion” language and instead
indicated that the fee may be awarded “in exceptional cases.” The
Senate Report associated with the 1946 act indicates that the statute is not intended to make fee awards an “ordinary thing in patent
suits” but instead to reserve such awards for “gross injustice.”
It is not contemplated that the recovery of attorney’s fees
will become an ordinary thing in patent suits, but the
discretion given the court in this respect, in addition to
the present discretion to award triple damages, will discourage infringement of a patent by anyone thinking that
all he would be required to pay if he loses the suit would
be a royalty. The provision is also made general so as to
enable the court to prevent a gross injustice to an alleged
infringer.
S. Rep. No. 1503, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946). When the 1952 act
was passed, the House Committee Report briefly mentioned the
“exceptional case” amendment to the statute—indicating that the
phrase “‘in exceptional cases’ has been added as expressing the
intention of the present statute as shown by its legislative history
and as interpreted by the courts.”
In its briefing, Octane argues that the Brooks Furniture test is overly
constrictive on district court discretion and flawed. In particular,
Octane argues that the First Amendment concerns that motivate
Noerr-Pennington are not present in the fee-shifting context and
that the result of the Brooks Furniture test is a disparate treatment
that disfavors awarding fees to accused infringers who prevail at
trial in violation of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court
in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) (holding that plaintiffs and defendants must be treated alike under an analogous feeshifting provision in copyright law). In the end, Octane argues that
the test should revert back to an Equitable Discretion Test (EDT),
which allows district courts to consider the totality of the circumstances when determining exceptional case fee awards.
In response, ICON argues Octane has mischaracterized Brooks
Furniture and that the test is not so restrictive. In particular, ICON
notes that, under the Brooks Furniture test, accused infringers
who prevail in litigation can prove an exceptional case by a variety
of mechanisms that go well beyond the strict baseless litigation
standard. Brooks Furniture specifically calls out litigation misconduct, inequitable conduct by the patentee, as well as “vexatious
or unjustified litigation” as justification for an exceptional case

227

finding. More broadly, Brooks Furniture identifies the possibility of
exceptional case awards based upon any “material inappropriate
conduct related to the matter in litigation.” However, ICON agrees
that the current test is more restrictive than pure equitable discretion. According to ICON, applying that test would effectively read
the phrase “exceptional cases” out of the statute, eliminating a key
limitation imposed by Congress.
In deciding patent cases, the Supreme Court frequently considers
whether principles in other areas of intellectual property law provide
guidance. Here, Octane suggests that the Court consider both
trademark and copyright law. The Lanham Act’s fee shifting statute
for trademark infringement is textually identical to patent law’s
§ 285 and the “exceptional case” limitation has been interpreted at
the circuit court level as providing equitable discretion to district
courts instead of being limited by any rigid formula. Noxell Corp. v.
Firehouse No. 1 Bar-B-Que Restaurant, 771 F.2d 521, 526 (D.C. Cir.
1985). The Noxell case is particularly important here because it was
penned by Justice Ginsburg (then Judge Ginsberg) and joined by
Justice Scalia (then Judge Scalia) who were colleagues on the D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals before being elevated to the Supreme Court.
In Noxell, the appellate panel held that bad faith was not necessary
for an exceptional case finding. Similarly, Octane argues that in Fogerty, the Supreme Court gave equitable discretion to district courts
in awarding fees. ICON attempts to distinguish those cases by
pointing to the “surprising lack of agreement” as to the meaning of
“exceptional case” and by highlighting the less restrictive language
of the copyright statute.
Both parties also claim legislative history support. Octane asserts
that Congress intended a broad conferral of equitable discretion
upon the district courts to grant fee awards to wrongfully accused
defendants to prevent “gross injustice[s],” and that the Brooks
Furniture test conflicts with decades of judicial interpretation of
§ 285, predating establishment of the Federal Circuit. ICON argues,
however, that when Congress actually intends to give district courts
discretion in a broad range, it does so expressly and does not confine the exercise of discretion to “exceptional cases.” ICON further
points to the fact that Congress affirmatively removed the statute’s
pre-1952 reference to discretion in favor of the more particular
exceptional case test.
The United States filed an amicus brief strongly in support of
Octane. The government relies on legislative history and similar
areas of the law such as the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act
in its argument that § 285 should be construed to allow a district
court to authorize a fee award to a prevailing defendant when it
determines—based on its analysis of the totality of circumstances
present in each case—that such an award is necessary to prevent
gross injustice to that defendant. The United States argues that
the Federal Circuit’s Brooks Furniture test has diminished § 285’s
effectiveness as a tool to discourage abusive patent litigation and
mitigate injustice suffered by prevailing parties in particular cases.
At least one amici, the New York IP Law Association, takes a middle
ground approach—agreeing with Octane that the bar is too high,
but argues against a purely discretional and nonstructured totality
of the circumstances test. A group of companies represented by 3M
and General Electric, as amici, also suggest that any approach to
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an exceptional case test should focus on bad actions rather than on
broad classes of actors, such as nonpracticing entities, and that any
test should be balanced.
To be sure, there are instances (some extremely well-publicized) of patent litigation abuse involving non-practicing
patent owners who use the courts in an effort to collect
large numbers of nuisance settlements. Yet this problem,
in the experience of Amici Companies, is no more serious
than that created by many infringing defendants who routinely fight off meritorious patent suits by pressing scores
of frivolous defenses and counterclaims, and who otherwise rely upon dilatory tactics to force unjust settlements.
Accordingly, the focus should be on curbing litigation
misconduct wherever it occurs. An evenhanded standard,
flexibly applied, allows just that.
In the exceptional case procedural dispute, petitioner Highmark
argues that a district court’s determination that a case was “objectively baseless” and thus amenable to an award of attorney fees
should receive deferential appellate review rather than the de
novo standard applied by the Federal Circuit. Highmark’s principle argument is that the case is controlled by the prior Supreme
Court decisions of Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988), and
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 496 U.S. 384 (1990). In Pierce, the Court
considered the proper standard of review for fee awards under the
Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). EAJA authorizes attorney fees
when the United States’ position is not “substantially justified,”
and Highmark argues that Pierce’s proposition that a position is not
substantially justified if it has no “reasonable basis in both law and
fact,” is a standard effectively identical to the Federal Circuit’s § 285
test, which deems a position objectively baseless if “no reasonable
litigant could believe it would succeed.” In Cooter, the Court considered the standard of review for decisions imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Prior to Cooter, the courts of appeals applied three different
standards of review to different kinds of Rule 11 questions—clearerror review regarding the factual basis for a claim, de novo review
of findings about whether a claim was “warranted by existing law,”
and abuse-of-discretion review of the amount of sanctions imposed.
The Federal Circuit adopted this same trifurcated standard for § 285,
and Highmark argues that Cooter squarely rejects this approach.
Highmark further asserts that the Court held that “all aspects” of
a district court’s decision to impose Rule 11 sanctions—including its “legal conclusions”—should be reviewed under a unitary,
abuse-of-discretion standard. Highmark argues that both Pierce and
Cooter address fee and sanction standards directly analogous to the
“objective baselessness” test, and that the Supreme Court in both
cases held that appellate courts should review awards under such
provisions for abuse of discretion.
Allcare responds that Pierce and Cooter actually work in its favor. Allcare asserts that Pierce noted that smaller dollar amounts counsels
in favor of deferential review, while larger awards might suggest a
more intensive review; and because patent cases commonly involve
large potential damage awards, giving them de novo review does
not raise the same concerns as raised in Pierce (that providing de
novo review would result in the generation of additional appeals
that would not otherwise be pursued). Allcare also argues that
Cooter contradicts Highmark’s position because one of the factors
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in favor of deferential review was that the district court was “best
situated” to consider the “local bar’s litigation practices” as to when
a Rule 11 sanction is warranted. Allcare argues that this is contrary
to Congress’s express determination that local variations in the
approach to patent litigation are undesirable, by its very creation of
the Federal Circuit.
Highmark also argues that the Federal Circuit’s consideration in
undertaking de novo review of objective-baselessness findings—
namely, that some such findings may turn on legal issues—is flawed
in light of Pierce; that Pierce called for deference even when the
lower court determination was “based upon evaluation of the purely
legal issue governing the litigation.” Relying again on the Federal
Circuit’s role in promoting patent law uniformity, Allcare responds
that the uniformity purpose can only be served if the Federal Circuit
applies de novo review to questions involving the interpretation of
the patent laws. The Federal Circuit decides many more patent cases
than any individual district court and therefore, Allcare argues, it is
much better suited to decide whether a litigant’s ultimately unsuccessful position was nonetheless an objectively reasonable one.
As in Octane, the United States filed an amicus brief supporting the
petitioner in Highmark. Here, the government argues that an appellate court should review a district court’s exceptional case finding
under 35 U.S.C. § 285 with deference, using an abuse-of-discretion
standard. The United States offers three guideposts in support of
its position: (1) Congress has long vested district courts with broad
discretion to determine when fee awards are necessary to prevent
gross injustice in appropriate patent cases—as evidenced by the
1946 version of the fee-shifting provision; (2) a sixty-year tradition
of deferential review strongly supports an abuse-of-discretion standard; and (3) in both Pierce and Cooter, the Supreme Court concluded that deferential review was appropriate because baselessness
determination involves a fact-intensive analysis that the trial court
is best positioned to conduct. However, the government does offer
that even under the abuse-of-discretion standard, appellate courts
remain free to reverse decisions premised on a pure error of law.

SIGNIFICANCE
Because of the high cost of patent litigation, a reduced standard for
fee shifting has the potential of having a large impact on the litigation landscape. And, accused infringers are looking to fee shifting
as a mechanism for reducing patent enforcement by nonpracticing
entities. However, it is unclear whether an equally applied lower
standard would have that result because defendants would also face
the risk of being assessed fees. Several years ago, Professor Jay
Kesan wrote about fee shifting in patent cases and concluded that
there is no deserving theoretical reason for believing the British
rule (liberally awarding fees) better promotes efficient primary
behavior and that only when the analysis is limited to very specific
cases, can it sometimes be shown that the British or American
rule is more efficient. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a
Better Patent System, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 763 (2002). However,
an unbalanced standard of practice—especially one directed against
nonpracticing entities—is likely to have a greater impact. Further,
to the extent wide deference is given to district court judges on this
issue, we should expect a greater degree of forum shopping and
venue battles as parties seek audience before judges more favorable
to their particular cause.
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases

In its briefing, ICON suggests that any policy-based shift in the rule
should be left to Congress. In fact, several bills are pending in Congress that would shift fees even further than that contemplated by
petitioners here. The leading proposal overwhelmingly passed in the
House with bipartisan support, is supported by President Obama,
and is now being considered in the Senate. See Innovation Act, H.R.
3309. The proposed legislation would rewrite § 285 to affirmatively
require an award of reasonable fees to the prevailing party unless
the court finds that “the position and conduct of the non-prevailing
… parties were reasonably justified in law and fact” or that special
circumstances would make an award unjust. Based upon its strong
support, the bill has a substantial likelihood of passing in the Senate
this term. If so, the Supreme Court decisions here would have little
precedential value beyond the already pending lawsuits. However, a
substantial contingent of patent litigators are hoping that Supreme
Court action here will temper the fervor for legislative reform.
One spillover in the case may be in the area of willful patent
infringement. Under the patent statute, a willful infringer can be
assessed with a punitive award of treble damages. In parallel to the
exceptional case rule, willfulness requires a finding of both objective
and subjective recklessness (or willfulness). There is some likelihood that a shift on the standard of review for exceptional cases will
lead to a shift on the willfulness side as well. In its amicus brief,
Google cautioned against such a linkage. However, that issue will
likely be reserved for future cases.

Dennis Crouch is an associate professor at the University of
Missouri School of Law in Columbia, Missouri. He publishes widely
on intellectual property law issues, including in his popular blog,
Patently-O. He can be reached at crouchdd@missouri.edu. Jafon
Fearson is a second-year law student at the University of Missouri
School of Law. He received his bachelor of science in biomedical
engineering and will be graduating from MU LAW in May 2015.
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